Abstract Following the classic work of Mitjuschin, Polterovich and Milleron, necessary and su¢ cient as well as su¢ cient conditions have been developed for when the multicommodity Law of Demand holds. We show when the widely cited Mitjuschin and Polterovich su¢ cient condition also becomes necessary. Using this result, violation regions for the very popular Modi…ed Bergson (or HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion)) class of utility functions, are fully characterized in terms of preference parameters. For a natural extension of the CES member of the Modi…ed Bergson family that is neither homothetic nor quasihomothetic, we create the …rst simple, explicit example of which we are aware that (i) fully characterizes violation regions in both the preference parameter and commodity spaces and (ii) analyzes the range of relative income and price changes within which violations occur.
Introduction
The question of when the Law of Demand for multiple goods holds has been studied for more than thirty years starting with Milleron (1974) and Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) followed by Kannai (1989) , Mas-Colell (1991) and Quah (2000 Quah ( , 2003 . Given that these conditions are stated locally, they may not always be easily applied to the entire commodity space. One known case where the Law of demand holds globally, as observed by Milleron (1974) and Mas-Colell (1991) , is when preferences are homothetic. For general preference relations Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) 1 and for separable preferences Quah (2003) have proposed su¢ cient conditions for the Law of Demand to hold that are far simpler to verify. Despite these numerous contributions, relatively little is known about (i) when the Law is violated for commonly used forms of utility, (ii) where the violations occur in the commodity space and (iii) the properties of the violations in terms of prices and incomes. The goal of this paper is to contribute to …lling these voids in the literature. Moreover, we create the …rst simple, explicit example of which we are aware that characterizes the violation regions and properties.
To address these questions, the existing su¢ cient conditions for the Law to hold although simpler in form are of little value unless they are also necessary. Given the observation of Mas-Colell (1991) that the least concave representation of preferences 2 is the "best candidate" to use when applying the widely cited Mitjuschin and Polterovich su¢ cient condition, it is natural to wonder whether its use ensures that the su¢ cient condition becomes necessary locally as well, and in particular in the entire commodity space. While this is not the case in general, we show that it is true for the widely cited Modi…ed Bergson family (Pollak 1970 , Section 1). 3 In this case, the simpli…ed Mitjuschin and Polterovich su¢ cient condition can be used to derive a very clear characterization of when violations occur in term of preference parameters for each member of the family. To more generally investigate violations, we introduce a natural extension of the CES member of the Modi…ed Bergson family. Although for this utility we cannot use the Mitjuschin and Polterovich su¢ cient condition, we are nevertheless able to derive a clear speci…cation of violation regions in both the preference parameter and commodity spaces. In the preference parameter space, we contrast the violation regions obtained from the necessary and su¢ cient and the su¢ cient conditions. In terms of the violation 1 Although the necessary and su¢ cient and simpli…ed su¢ cient conditions are generally associated with Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) , the results were derived independently by Milleron (1974) .
2 A concave function U representing the preference relation is least concave if and only if every concave utility function representing the preference relation is given by T U , where T is a strictly increasing, concave function of a single variable (see Debreu 1976 ). Whenever we refer to a least concave utility, it is understood that the representation is only de…ned up a positive a¢ ne transformation.
regions in the commodity space, for a …xed price ratio we derive speci…c bounds in terms of income levels. Also for the set of points along the expansion path between the income bounds where the Law of Demand is violated, we characterize the set of corresponding price change ratios.
In the next Section, we …rst show when the simpli…ed Mitjuschin and Polterovich su¢ cient condition becomes necessary and then use this result to analyze the Modi…ed Bergson family. In Section 3, the new extension of the CES utility is introduced and used to analyze violation regions and properties. Finally, Section 4 contains the concluding comments. Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) propose both a necessary and su¢ cient condition and a su¢ cient condition for characterizing when the Law of Demand holds. Because the latter is simpler, it is more widely referenced. However since it is only a su¢ cient condition for the Law of Demand to hold, it cannot be used directly to characterize when the Law is violated. In this Section after reviewing both conditions, we demonstrate when the more widely cited su¢ cient condition also becomes necessary and can be used to characterize violations. The su¢ cient condition is then used for the popular Modi…ed Bergson class of preferences to derive very simple restrictions in terms of the underlying preference parameters for when violations occur.
A Simpli…ed Approach
Let be a strictly convex and concavi…able preference ordering (de…ned on a convex subset of the space of n commodities c = def (c 1 ; :::; cn) where typically it is assumed that = R n + ) which is represented by a C 3 , strictly monotone, concave utility function 
holds for every nonzero price change vector x 2 R n , where h = (h 1 ; ; hn).
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A well known result due to Milleron (1974) and Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) is that h is monotone at p if and only if the inequality
4 The traditional statement of the Law of Demand is (p 0 p) (h (p 0 ) h (p)) < 0 for any p 6 = p 0 . Taking x = p and noticing that h = @h @p p, it can be seen that the de…nition in eqn. (1) is the di¤erentiable form of the Law of Demand (see Section 4.C in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995).
5 It should be noted that Milleron (1974) , Mas-Colell (1991), p. 282 and Quah (2003) de…ne the monotonicity condition eqn. (1) as a strict inequality. Mas-Colell for instance refers to this as strict monotonicity. Alternatively, Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) and Kannai (1989) de…ne monotonicity as a weak inequality. For the latter h is monotone if and only if the left hand side of eqn. (2) is 4:
holds for c = h(p). 6 The term on the left hand side of (2) will be referred to as the Mitjuschin-Polterovich coe¢ cient and denoted by M . 7 Our primary interest in this paper will be in violations of the Law of Demand. And when we say the Law of Demand or monotonicity is violated, we will mean that there exists at least one point c in the commodity space such that the sign of the inequality (1) reverses for at least one price change vector x. This is equivalent to M > 4 at that point. It was observed in Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) that by the concavity of U , the …rst term on the left hand side of (2) is non-positive, so that a su¢ cient condition for monotonicity of h is (@ 2 U (c)c; c)
and the left hand side of (3) will be referred to as the modi…ed Mitjuschin-Polterovich coe¢ cient, which will be denoted as M U : (See also Milleron 1974 ). As noted above, given its simplicity this form is more widely cited than (2). In this paper when monotonicity is said to hold without specifying p, it should be understood to hold for the full commodity space. In order to use it to characterize violations, we next answer the natural question of when (3) also becomes necessary.
Proposition 1
The …rst term on the left hand side of (2) vanishes if and only if the Hessian matrix of U is singular, i.e., when the Hessian determinant H U (c) vanishes.
Proof First prove su¢ ciency. It follows from footnote 6 that if H = 0, then the …rst term of eqn. (2) vanishes. Next prove necessity. Assume that H 6 = 0. Note the identity in Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1978) 
where the supremum is over the set of y for which (y; @U (c)) = 1. Next we will show that
where B H is the bordered Hessian determinant of U: Diagonalize the Hessian matrix @ 2 U , so that in the appropriate coordinate system this matrix assumes the form 0
and the Hessian determinant is given by
of U is the determinant of the matrix 0
6 It should be noted that if the Hessian matrix is singular, then its inverse matrix is understood as having in…nite eigenvalues corresponding to zero eigenvalues of the Hessian, and if they appear in the denominator of the …rst term of eqn. (2), then this term is 0.
7 It should be noted that M is invariant under monotone increasing transformations of the utility representation.
where @U = (U 1 ; U 2 ; :::; Un). Expanding the determinant of (6) by the last row (or column), we get the well-known formula
so that the ratio of the bordered Hessian determinant to the Hessian determinant is given by
The right hand side of (8) is obviously equal to @ 2 U (c) 1 @U (c); @U (c) . It follows that the …rst term of (2) equals
The assumptions on U imply that (c; @U (c)) > 0 and that B H is nonzero, hence the Proposition.
We call any point c where the corresponding H U (c) = 0 a minimum concavity point (based on U ) 8 ;9 and next show that at such a point the simpli…ed Mitjuschin and Polterovich su¢ cient condition becomes necessary (also see Kannai 1989) . Note that this set of points is maximal if preferences are represented by a least concave utility representation.
Proposition 2 The su¢ cient condition (3) is necessary and su¢ cient if and only if c = h(p) is a minimum concavity point. Consequently, the su¢ cient condition also becomes necessary for all of if and only if every point c 2 is a minimum concavity point (based on U ).
Proof Proposition 2 follows at once from the de…nition of minimum concavity points and Proposition 1.
Note that the less concave U is, the larger the set of minimum concavity points related to it. (For general U , minimum concavity points may not exist at all.) Thus it is natural to consider minimum concavity points based on least concave utility representations (as de…ned above in footnote 2). It is well known (Kannai 1985 ) that if is compact, then every indi¤erence surface of contains at least one minimum concavity point. Hence it is natural when analyzing monotonicity, to consider least concave utility functions u representing : We use Mu to denote the modi…ed Mitjuschin-Polterovich coe¢ cient (the left hand side of eqn. (3)) based on the least concave form u. It should be stressed that the …rst term on the left hand side of eqn. (2) vanishes only at minimum concavity points and there M becomes equal to the modi…ed Mitjuschin-Polterovich coe¢ cient Mu. Given our interest in violations we look for points where M > 4; or alternatively, when monotonicity holds, given that this condition is necessary and su¢ cient. 8 A point c is a point of minimum concavity for the function U if and only if there exists a neighborhood of c such that U is least concave there. Equivalently, the graph of U , which is de…ned by f(c; t) : U (c) = tg, has a contact of second order (at least at one direction) at c with the tangent (hyper)plane of the graph. In other words, at least one principal curvature of the graph vanishes at c.
9 Given that a minimum concavity point may not be in the commodity space ; it is advantageous for certain forms of U to compactify and to de…ne minimum concavity at a boundary point c by the asymptotic vanishing of the ratio The set of minimum concavity points based on u corresponds to all of for the widely referenced classes of homothetic and quasihomothetic preference relations, where the terms homothetic and quasihomothetic are de…ned as customary (see Deaton 1980, pp. 143-5) .
Proposition 3
If is de…ned on all of and is homothetic or quasihomothetic, 10 then every point is a minimum concavity point for the least concave u representing : Hence, the Mitjuschin-Polterovich su¢ cient condition (3) becomes necessary as well for all of .
Proof A homothetic de…ned on all of may be represented by a utility function u such that u is homogeneous of degree 1 (for example, u (c) = c 0 , where c 0 c and c 0 is on the principal diagonal of ). See also Kannai (1970) and Hosoya (2011) for the construction of u. The …rst derivatives of u are homogeneous of degree 0, so that by Euler's Theorem
i.e., c is an eigenvector of the Hessian matrix @ 2 u (c) with a zero eigenvalue. Hence the Hessian determinant varnishes everywhere. A similar argument implies that the Hessian of the corresponding utility representation of quasihomothetic preferences vanishes as well.
A stronger result can be obtained if we add the assumption that is representable by an additively separable concave U , i.e.,
Proposition 4 Assume is de…ned on and is representable by an additively separable concave U . Then the set of minimum concavity points based on u is the whole space if and only if U is homothetic or quasihomothetic.
Proof We have to show that if a set of minimum concavity points (based on the least concave representation) c = (c 1 ; :::; c n ) is the whole space and the preference relation is representable by an additively separable U , then is homothetic or quasihomothetic. It may be shown by an elementary computation that if U is additively separable, then at a minimum concavity point (based on the least concave representation) the function
has a maximal value relative to the indi¤erence surface U = const. (These points may be found even if we don't know explicitly the least concave u corresponding to ): Application of the Lagrange multiplier method leads to the system
; n 1 0 It should be noted that although = R n + for homothetic preferences as is standard, for quasihomothetic preferences, it may correspond to a subset of R n + due to the translated origin.
where
Evaluating (12), we get the system
We may eliminate K 2 from the system (14) of n equations so as to get a system of n 1 equations in n unknowns. Such a system represents, generically, a curve. It su¢ ces for our purposes to consider the case n = 2: We are then led to the equation
which is valid whenever (c 1 ; c 2 ) is a point of least concavity. Setting
we see that the set f(c 1 ; c 2 )g of points of least concavity coincides with the set of solutions of the equation a 1 (c 1 ) = a 2 (c 2 ), or is a subset of the set of solutions. In our setting, the set of minimum concavity points coincides with the full set . This may happen if and only if a 1 = a 2 =const. Consider the ordinary di¤erential equation
where a is a constant and U i is the unknown function. Setting v = U 0 i we obtain the ordinary di¤erential equation
The solution of (18) is well known, see Kamke (1959) , item 6.125, p. 573. The solution is given by the representation
where C 1 and C 2 are constants. We distinguish the following sub-cases: a) a 1:
where C 0 1 and C 0 2 are constants. All of these cases are homothetic or quasihomothetic. (Having U i (x) monotone and concave in all of R + imposes restrictions on a, C 1 , C 0 1 , C 2 and C 0 2 . In some other cases, one gets monotonicity and concavity on subsets of R + ).
It follows from cases (a)-(c) in the proof of Proposition 4 that an additively separable utility function (10) which represents homothetic or quasi preferences corresponds exactly to the Modi…ed Bergson Family.
11 (Although Pollak 1971 never considers the question of minimum concavity points, he shows that the class of additively separable, homothetic or quasihomothetic utility functions generate demand functions that are locally linear in income and include the Bergson and modi…ed Bergson families.)
(ii) CES form with a negative translated origin: U i (x) = (x + q i ) = , where q i > 0; > 1; (iii) CES form with a positive translated origin:
;where q i > 0; > 1 and x < q i :
Next we show that for each of these utilities, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for monotonicity or the Law of Demand to be violated can be stated very simply as follows.
Proposition 5 For the Modi…ed Bergson family members (i)-(v)
, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the Law of Demand to be violated is characterized by:
1. Type (i) utility: Law of Demand is never violated for any c 2 ; 2. Type (ii) utility: Law of Demand is violated for some c 2 if and only if > 3; 3. Types (iii)-(v): Law of Demand is always violated independently of the preference parameters for some c 2 .
Proof For Type (i) utility, since preferences are homothetic, it follows directly from Proposition 6 below that M = 0 and hence monotonicity always holds. In the following proof, for simplicity, we assume that there are only two commodities. The multiple commodity case can be discussed similarly. For Type (ii) utility, we have
where q 1 ; q 2 > 0 and > 1. The set of the minimum concavity points is again the whole space and so we can use the original Mitjuschin-Polterovich su¢ cient condition (3) in terms of the least concave form as a necessary and su¢ cient condition for monotonicity. The least concave form is given by
It can be veri…ed that
If the preference ordering is de…ned on (0; 1) (0; 1), then
where the equal sign can be obtained if and only if (c 1 ; c 2 ) = (0; 1) or (1; 0). For quasihomothetic preferences, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the Law of Demand to be violated can be stated as Mu > 4. Noting that the maximum value of Mu can be reached in the limit, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for monotonicity to be violated is
For Type (iii) utility, we have
where q 1 ; q 2 > 0 and > 1. It can be veri…ed that
We next show that monotonicity of demand fails for some c if q 1 = q 2 = q; and the preference ordering is de…ned on (q; 1) (q; 1). The case when q 1 6 = q 2 can be discussed similarly. Assuming that c 2 = 2c 1 q, we will have
Letting c 1 ! q, we will have lim
Therefore, the monotonicity condition is always violated somewhere. For Type (iv) utility, we have
where 1 ; 2 > 0. It can be veri…ed that
Letting c 1 ! 0, we will have
Then letting c 2 ! 1, we will have
Therefore, monotonicity is always violated. It should be noted that due to symmetry, when c 1 ! 1 and c 2 ! 0, we also have Mu ! 1. For Type (v) utility, we have
where > 1, q 1 ; q 2 > 0 and q 1 c 1 ; q 2 c 2 > 0. It can be veri…ed that
(39) Letting c 1 ! 0, we will have
Then letting c 2 ! q 2 , we will have
Therefore, monotonicity is always violated. It should be noted that due to symmetry, when c 1 ! q 1 and c 2 ! 0, we also have Mu ! 1.
The Modi…ed Bergson utilities (i)-(v) are quite special in that for four of the …ve members, monotonicity is either never violated or always violated no matter what preference parameters are assumed. Although it is possible to show when violations occur for the utilities (i)-(v), it is not straightforward to characterize analytically the resulting violation regions in the commodity space. Using numerical analysis, we plot the violation regions of the commodity space for the Type (iii) utility in terms of contours in Figures 1(a) and (b) . We indicate values of Mu; the modi…ed MitjuschinPolterovich coe¢ cient evaluated in terms of u, corresponding to di¤erent regions of violations in commodity space for the case q 1 = q 2 = 1 and for the two di¤erent preference parameter values = 1 and = 2. A similar, but messier, computation shows that for arbitrary nonnegative q 1 ; q 2 , not both zero, monotonicity is violated for the commodity bundles c satisfying c 2 q 2 = 2 (c 1 q 1 ) with c 1 close to q 1 . It is natural to ask why the violations are centered at the boundaries of the commodity space. In fact it is clear from the argument in the proof of Proposition 5 that the maximum value of Mu is always reached at a boundary point. Although we cannot give a direct economic interpretation of why violations occur at the boundaries, it is possible to provide some interesting intuition in the classic contingent claim -…nan-cial asset asset model. In Appendix A utilizing Hurwicz, Jordan and Kannai (1987) and Kubler, Selden and Wei (2013) , we provide a simple example based on Type (iii) utility where the Law of Demand is violated for contingent claims and corresponding to a natural transformation of variables, the risk free asset can become a Gi¤en good. The region of asset space where the risk free asset is a Gi¤en good is seen to occur at a boundary which is associated with low levels of income and has a natural economic interpretation. Moreover this interpretation readily carries over to the violation region in contingent claim space.
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Finally as noted in Section 1, Milleron (1974) and Mas-Colell (1991) observed that the left hand side of the Mitjuschin-Polterovich su¢ cient condition (3) is identically 0 if is homothetic and the representation U is homogeneous of degree 1. In fact, the converse of this observation is also true.
Proposition 6 A strictly convex preference ordering, which is represented by a concave utility function U the Hessian determinant of which never vanishes, is homothetic if and only if M vanishes.
Proof It follows from (3) in Theorem 2.1 of Kannai (1989) that M vanishes if and only if the consumption vector c is proportional to the tangent vector of the income expansion path corresponding to at this c: This implies that the income expansion path coincides with a line through the origin. This is equivalent to homotheticity. An elementary proof not using the results of Kannai (1989) may also be given.
Violation Region and Properties: A Canonical Example
In this Section, we seek to overcome the di¢ culty that for Modi…ed Bergson preferences it is not straightforward to analytically characterize either the violation region in the commodity space or the dependence of violations on prices and income by introducing a new form of preferences.
WAES Utility
Assume that for the two commodity case, preferences are represented by
where 1 ; 2 > 1. 13 It should be noted that for this utility, straightforward computation of the standard elasticity of substitution yields
It is clear that in this case, the resulting elasticity of substitution is simply the weighted harmonic average of the elasticities of substitutions of the CES forms corresponding to = 1 and = 2 : It is for this reason that we refer to (42) as the weighted average elasticity of substitution (WAES) utility.
To see why the WAES utility can be viewed as a natural extension of the CES utility, de…ne = ( 1 + 2 )=2: Then 1 and 2 can be thought of as perturbations of where 1 = + e and 2 = e (i.e., e = ( 1 2 ) =2). Rewriting (42), yields
It is natural to ask how, for a given associated with the homothetic special case where 1 = 1 = , perturbing e a¤ects the shape of the WAES indi¤erence curves. Figure 2 considers the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences where ! 0 along with perturbations associated with e = 0:5 and 1:0: The base Cobb-Douglas indi¤erence curves associated with e = 0 are clearly symmetric around the 45 ray. Increasing e from 0 to 0:5 and 1:0 represents a type of rotation of the indi¤erence curves resulting in increasing asymmetry. And when > 1; su¢ cient levels of asymmetry will be seen in the next Subsection to give rise to violations in the monotonicity of demand (see footnote 15). 
Violation Region
Since preferences represented by the WAES utility (42) are neither homothetic nor quasihomothetic, it follows from Proposition 4 that the set of minimum concavity points (based on u) is not the entire commodity space and hence we cannot use the su¢ cient condition (3) to discuss restrictions on preference parameters corresponding to violations.
14 Nevertheless as we next show, it is possible to use the necessary and su¢ cient form (2) to determine when violations occur in terms of the preference parameters 1 and 2 and where violations occur in the commodity space. Straightforward computation of M yields
To …nd out when M < 4; de…ne t = c
Solving the inequality M < 4 and investigating the roots of M = 4, we …nd that (2) addition, 1 + 2 > 2; then the roots are strictly positive and monotonicity is violated for positive (c 1 ; c 2 )-pairs -namely, for those consumption pairs for which
holds. Summarizing, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for monotonicity to hold everywhere in is
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(
As shown in Appendix B, this result can be extended to the case with more than two commodities. The resulting violation region de…ned by (48) corresponds to a subset of the consumption space bounded by two curves (generalized parabolas or parabolas), which are de…ned by 
See Figure 3 . 16 It should be noted that for WAES utility, if the necessary and su¢ cient condition for monotonicity is violated then there exists a curve in the commodity space de…ned by c 1 1 = tc 2 2 where t > 0 and each point along this curve has the same M value greater than 4: Note that each of these curves which lies between the M = 4 boundary curves in Figure 3 , intersects every vertical and horizontal line in : 1 5 It should be noted that the necessary and su¢ cient condition (49) for monotonicity to hold can be also written as: jej < 2 p or 1:
The comparison between e and shows how much the utility departs from the CES case. 1 6 Clearly, the violation region in Figure 3 di¤ers from that of the translated origin Modi…ed Bergson example in Figure 1 , where violations are centered at the boundaries of the commodity space. However if one considers an analogous translation of the origin for the WAES case, then the resulting pattern of violations is also centered at the boundaries. Figure 4 (a) formed by the points ( 1; 3); ( 1; 1) and (3; 1); then 1 + 2 < 2 and demand will be monotone. Finally, it should be stressed that when preferences are neither homothetic nor quasihomothetic, using the least concave utility u in the su¢ cient condition (3) does not yield the necessary and su¢ cient condition in general. To see this, assume 1 > 2 > 0; 
which clearly di¤ers from (49) and hence should not be used to characterize the violation region in the parameter space.
Remark 1 It is interesting to observe that applying the su¢ cient condition given in Quah (2003) , p. 719, to the WAES case, one obtains
which is clearly di¤erent from the necessary and su¢ cient condition given in (49). This is illustrated in Figure 4(b) , where the inequality (53) de…nes the region between two 45 rays, which start from the points ( 1; 3) and (3; 1). These two rays divide the M 2 region in Figure 4 (a) for monotonicity to hold into three parts. The area labeled M 22 corresponding to (53) is clearly smaller than the region given by the necessary and su¢ cient condition (49), which is Figure 4 (b). 
Violation Properties
Building on the characterization of the violation region in the commodity space discussed above and illustrated in Figure 3 , we next consider the subset of violation points corresponding to a given price ratio p 1 =p 2 . In Figure 5 , we plot the expansion path c 2 = f (c 1 ; p 1 =p 2 ) associated with p 1 =p 2 = 3: The expansion path always intersects both violation boundaries. The two parallel budget constraints going through the upper and lower intersection points are denoted I
(1) =p 2 and I (2) =p 2 ; respectively. For each normalized income value I=p 2 between I (1) =p 2 and I (2) =p 2 ; monotonicity will be violated for every (c 1 ; c 2 ) point along the expansion path. Following the calculations in the previous Section, it is straightforward to identify the upper and lower bounds for I=p 2 given a p 1 =p 2 ratio. (Without loss of generality, we will always assume that 1 > 2 in the discussion below.)
Result 1 Assume the WAES utility (42). For a …xed p 1 =p 2 , the Law of Demand is violated if and only if
where I
(1)
and
Given that the Law of Demand is violated for each of the points along the expansion path c 2 = f (c 1 ; p 1 =p 2 ) between I
(1) =p 2 and I (2) =p 2 ; it is natural to wonder if one can characterize in some way the set of corresponding price change ratios x 1 =x 2 resulting in the left hand side of the inequality (1) being strictly positive.
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Result 2 Assume the WAES utility (42). Given a price ratio p 1 =p 2 , for any point in the violation region along the corresponding expansion path f (c 1 ; p 1 =p 2 ), the price change ratio x 1 =x 2 that makes the left hand side of (1) strictly positive must be (i) negative and (ii) in the range
Proof Denote the optimal demand functions as h 1 and h 2 respectively. Implicitly di¤erentiating h 1 and h 2 and de…ning
we obtain the following simple price derivatives
Therefore, we have
Since L 1 ; L 2 0, for a violation to occur we must have L 3 > 0. But from (71) this can happen only if x 1 x 2 < 0; because s
thus verifying (i) in the Result. From (70) because
always select price changes x 1 and x 2 such that L 2 = 0: 20 Combining (69) and (71) and simplifying yields
For the violation to occur, we require that L 1 + L 3 > 0, implying that
where A 1 and A 2 are de…ned by (60) and (61).
To gain additional insight into Result 2, note that if one assumes 2 = 1, it follows from the de…nition = ( 1 + 2 )=2 that 1 = 1 + 2 and the expression (59) simpli…es to +
In this case, if we choose the price change ratio x 1 x 2 = p 1 p 2 , we know that there exists at least one point on the corresponding expansion path for which the left hand side of (1) is strictly positive. To see this, remember that for a violation we must have > 1, and it follows that + p 2 1 > 1 and
Since we don't specify I=p 2 in Result 2, the price change ratio range we give above is the union of the set of ranges for all points along a given expansion path in the violation region. Therefore, this range should be always larger than the price ratio range corresponding to a speci…c I=p 2 . To illustrate this point more clearly, de…ne the angle between the price change vector (x 1 ; x 2 ) and the commodity change vector ( c 1 ; c 2 ) which is obtained by applying the @h @p to (x 1 ; x 2 ) as . Then it can be easily seen that
In the case of a single good, a violation can only occur when demand and price move in the same direction (the Gi¤en good e¤ect); for the WAES case both goods are normal and yet the angle can be less than 90 (but is bounded away from 0). For a given p 1 =p 2 and I=p 2 , Figure 6 illustrates (i) the range of the price change ratio when the angle is less than 90 and (ii) the minimal value of the angle. The price change ratio is plotted versus the angle for three di¤erent ( 1 ; 2 ) pairs (in order to emphasize the role of the comparison between and e for a violation to occur, we show ( ; e) values instead of ( 1 ; 2 ) in Figure 6 ). The bottom, middle and top curves correspond, respectively, to a constant M value greater than, equal to and less than 4. Given the range of x 1 =x 2 values when < 90 in Figure 6 , it can be veri…ed by straightforward calculations that this range is less than that derived from Result 2.
To view the range in Result 2 directly, see Figure 7 , where 1 = 16; 2 = 2 and p 1 =p 2 = 3. The angle is plotted in the space corresponding to x 1 =x 2 and I=p 2 . Inside the oval labeled 90 ; the angle < 90 , implying that P 2 i;j @hi @pj x i x j >0. The leftmost and rightmost x 1 =x 2 values on the oval correspond to the boundary values given in Result 2. It should be noted that in this Figure it is also possible to obtain the x 1 =x 2 range with the angle less than 90 for a …xed I=p 2 as in Figure 6 by drawing a horizontal ray corresponding to the given I=p 2 : The two intersection points between this ray and the 90 oval determine the associated x 1 =x 2 range. 
Concluding Comments
Following the initial contributions of Mitjuschin, Polterovich and Milleron, research on the Law of Demand has focused predominantly on when the monotonicity condition holds. In this paper, we take the …rst steps in examining when the converse is true not just in general terms but in terms of speci…c restrictions on preference parameters and regions in the commodity space. Using the simpli…ed Mitjuschin and Polterovich su¢ cient condition, we are able to characterize violations in terms speci…c preference parameter restrictions for members of the widely used Modi…ed Bergson (or HARA) family. In contrast to the known result that for the homothetic CES member where violations never occur at any point in the commodity space no matter what preference parameter is assumed, we show that for three of the remaining four members of the family violations always occur independent of the preference parameters assumed for some point in the commodity space. To provide sharper focus on the behavior of violations in the commodity space, we introduce a natural generalization of the Modi…ed Bergson family where each commodity is still a normal good. For this nonhomothetic utility we are able to fully characterize the region of the commodity space in which violations are possible and derive for points in this region the bounds on possible income levels and price change ratios. This research would seem to raise a number of potentially interesting questions such as the following. Is there any simple economic intuition to explain the location of the violation region in the commodity space? (In Appendix A, we provide some indirect insight for the case where an economically meaningful transformation of variables can be applied.) Moreover, at a speci…c point where a violation occurs for a given budget line and price change ratio, is it possible to explain intuitively what is required in terms of the shape of indi¤erence curves that results in the violation?
A Location of Violation Region: Intuition
As noted in the Section 2 discussion of the Type (iii) Modi…ed Bergson utility, violations of monotonicity occur at the boundaries of the commodity space (Figure 1 ). Some interesting, albeit indirect, intuition for why this is the case can be obtained from using the result that if the commodities violate the Law of Demand, then there is a corresponding set of composite commodities, at least one of which is a Gi¤en good. The quantity demanded of each composite commodity is a …xed linear combination of the quantities demanded of the original goods. 2 1 In this appendix, we illustrate the regions of violations of the Law of Demand and regions of a Gi¤en transformed good in a simple example paralleling the case considered in Figure 1(a) . The original goods can be interpreted as contingent claims and the transformed composite commodities are two …nancial assets, one risky, the other risk free. The latter is the Gi¤en good and some insight can be gained into why the violation regions for both the contingent claims and …nancial assets occur where they do.
Consider the following speci…c form of the Type (iii) Modi…ed Bergson utility
It follows from Proposition 5(3) that for this utility, the Law of Demand will be violated for some (c 1 ; c 2 ) 2 . Consider the following transformation
which will be seen below to result in the transformed variable z 2 being a Gi¤en good. The utility function (78) becomes Consider the following transformation z 1 = x 2 c 1 + x 1 c 2 and z 2 = x 1 c 1 + x 2 c 2 :
Denoting the prices for (c 1 ; c 2 ) as (p 1 ; p 2 ) and the prices for (z 1 ; z 2 ) as (P 1 ; P 2 ), it can be easily veri…ed that p 1 = x 2 P 1 + x 1 P 2 and p 2 = x 1 P 1 + x 2 P 2 ; Next we want to show that z 2 is a Gi¤en good. To see this, denote the prices for (c 1 ; c 2 ) as (p 1 ; p 2 ) and the prices for (z 1 ; z 2 ) as (P 1 ; P 2 ), and it can be easily veri…ed that P 1 = 2p 1 + 0:5p 2 and
In Figure 8 (c), the lighter color oval contains the set of (z 1 ; z 2 ) pairs where @z 2 =@P 2 > 0 assuming P 1 = 1; de…ning the Gi¤en good region. Comparing the ovals in Figures 8(b) and (c), it is clear as expected that the Gi¤en good region is a subset of the violation region. Now in general, when performing this variable transformation, the new composite commodity that exhibits Gi¤en good behavior may not have a clear economic meaning. However in the classic contingent claim -…nancial asset setting, a natural interpretation can be given to the transformed variables and intuition given for the location of the Gi¤en good region as well as for the contingent claim violation region.
Suppose c 1 and c 2 denote quantities of contingent claim commodities in states one and two, where the states are equiprobable. Then the transformed variables can be viewed as asset holdings, where z 1 denotes units of a risky asset which pays 2 in state one and 0:5 in state two and z 2 denotes units of a risk free asset which pays 1 in both states. The contingent claim quantities are given by c 1 = 2z 1 + z 2 and c 2 = 0:5z 1 + z 2 :
The utility function (80) is a¢ nely equivalent to U (z 1 ; z 2 ) = 1 2 (2z 1 + z 2 1) 1 1 2 (0:5z 1 + z 2 1) 1 ;
where 1 2 can be viewed as the state probabilities, consistent with our equiprobable assumption. The utility (83) can be viewed as a standard Expected Utility representation with the NM (von Neumann-Morgenstern) index de…ned on consumption c W (c) = (c 1)
1 :
The intuition for why at low levels of income the risk free asset can always become a Gi¤en good for an NM index that takes the Type (iii) form is discussed in Kubler, Selden and Wei (2013) . The argument parallels the famous story of potatoes being a Gi¤en good. When the consumer's income is small, most of her income is invested in the risk free asset z 2 rather than (c), correspond respectively to di¤erent Mitjuschin-Polterovich values and di¤erent values of @z 2 =@P 2 as de…ned below.
